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SEPARATION OF
CHURCH AND STATE-
A Constitutional View
PAUL G. KAUPER*
T HE TERM, "SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE," used so freely,
is not a term found in either the federal or the state constitutions.
It is a symbolic term used to describe relationships between law and
religion, between government and the churches, between the civil com-
munity and the religious community. In terms of the American consti-
tutional tradition, separation of Church and State rests on the premise
that the functions of Church and State are not to be commingled, that
each has its separate task to perform, that the Church is concerned with
spiritual and moral matters affecting both its members and the whole
community and that the State, as a secular instrument which enjoys a
monopoly of coercive power, is concerned with the government of the
civil community. It is not the State's business to operate a church or to
prescribe an official creed for its citizens, and it is not the function of the
churches to run the government. Each within its own sphere is supreme.
Neither is to dominate the other. This separateness serves the cause
of human freedom. Because it is not the State's business to interfere
with or intervene in religious matters, whether by restricting the exer-
cise of religious freedom or by using its coercive power to compel belief,
separation, while assuring the freedom of religion for the individual and
churches, also assures freedom for the nonconformist and nonbeliever.
Likewise, by assuring the freedom of the state from ecclesiastical domi-
nation, the separation principle protects against the imposition by the
Church, through the State, of its beliefs and views upon the civil com-
munity.
Having in mind the long history of this problem and the unfortunate
consequences of either State domination over the Church or the Church's
* A.B., J.D., Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
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domination over the State, we can be grate-
ful in this country for a tradition of sepa-
ration that has contributed so much to
freedom, to civic peace, and to the strength
and vitality of religion and of the churches.
In a land with as many diverse religious
groups as the United States, separation of
Church and State is essential to secure the
conditions of civil peace and harmony.
Our experience amply demonstrates that
religious life flourishes best when religion
depends on the voluntary adherence and
support of the believer and not on coercive
power exercised by the State.
Co-operative Separatism
It should be equally clear, however, that
in the American tradition the doctrine and
practice of separation of Church and State
and the concept of the secular and neutral
State has not meant, as in some countries,
the hostility of government to religion or
even indifference to the significance of re-
ligion in the life of the community. On the
contrary, American experience has demon-
strated that consistent with separation of
Church and State, the State and the
churches can live in a state of friendly co-
operation. We may describe this situation
as "co-operative separatism."
To describe this relationship in terms of
a metaphor like "the wall of separation of
Church and State" is inaccurate and mis-
leading. This is so for several reasons. In
the first place, the figure of a "wall" sug-
gests the drawing of a fixed and clear line
between the domain of government, on the
one hand, and of religion, on the other.
By nature this is impossible. We see this
more clearly when we realize that what we
are talking about is the relation between
the civil and religious community. All are
members of the civil community. But a
part are members of the smaller religious
community embraced within the larger civil
community. There can be no wall dividing
those citizens who are members of both
communities.
Secondly, the "wall" concept suggests
that a line can be drawn which clearly
separates the function of Church and State.
This is not an accurate portrayal. The
truth is that even though the principal func-
tions of government and of organized re-
ligion are separate and distinct, there is an
area of overlapping or concurrent function
in which they have a common interest, the
area, indeed, which is the source of our
chief problems today. Thus, in the field
of education and social welfare, govern-
ment and religious organizations have com-
mon interests.
Finally, the "wall" metaphor is mislead-
ing in so far as it suggests that Church and
State have nothing to do with each other.
Perhaps it would be better to speak of a
fence since, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter has
said, "Good fences make good neighbors."
But the really important point is that
government and law, on the one hand, and
religion, on the other, serve each other's
needs. The churches and their members
depend upon the State to provide those
conditions of public peace and security and
the public services necessary to enable the
churches to enjoy freedom and to accom-
plish their mission. The authority of the
State and the effective maintenance of the
peace of the community are indispensable
to the free exercise of religion. Conversely,
the churches perform a valuable function
for the State by helping to create the spir-
itual climate and the respect for moral and
ethical values that furnish the foundation
of our free and democratic society. Whether
we put the matter in terms of natural law,
or in terms of the churches' discharge of a
prophetic ministry, or the spiritual leaven-
ing of the community, the churches and
the intangible forces generated by their
witness and teaching make their contribu-
tions to the welfare of the civil community.
Just as the relationship between Church
and State cannot be described in terms of
a "wall of separation," so it is equally true
that at no time in our history has this re-
lationship been characterized as "absolute
and complete separation of Church and
State." This is true only if we are thinking
of formal control arrangements. To be
sure our governments operate no churches
and have no voice or representation in the
affairs of the churches, and in turn the
churches have no representation or voice
in government. Here we have absolute
and complete separation. But if we turn
to the substance of things, it is readily ap-
parent that in the American tradition of
Church-State relations and consistent,
therefore, with the historic American un-
derstanding of separation of Church and
State, government has recognized the im-
portance and relevancy of religion in
American life and has accommodated its
policies to this situation. The acknowledge-
ment in many of our state constitutions of
dependence upon God, the references to a
Deity in our national anthem, the annual
Thanksgiving proclamations, the opening
of sessions of Congress by prayer, the com-
missioning of chaplains for the armed forces
and the recognition of the place of chap-
lains in providing a spiritual ministry for
those in hospitals and prisons, the authori-
zation of marriages by ministers, priests
and rabbis-all signify the awareness by
government of the place of religion in
American thought and life. Moreover, gov-
ernment has recognized the service ren-
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dered by churches to the community by
granting them immunity to property taxes
for property owned and held for religious
purposes, as well as deductions under the
income, estate and gift tax laws for contri-
butions made to religious organizations.
The laws of the states have facilitated the
work of religious bodies by authorizing the
incorporation of churches, congregations
and auxiliary organizations. Finally, it
should be noted and emphasized that the
federal government, in disbursing funds
and property for specified purposes com-
ing within the power of the federal govern-
ment to spend for the general welfare, has
extended this aid impartially to all organi-
zations and institutions that help to achieve
the public objectives of the spending pro-
gram, including aid to institutions under
the control of religious bodies. This is in
the area of concurrent or overlapping func-
tions. Thus, under the Hill-Burton Act,
grants to assist in the construction of new
hospital facilities have been made to all
qualified hospitals, including those operated
under religious auspices. Similarly, colleges
operated by church bodies have shared in
loans from the federal government to build
income-producing facilities such as dormi-
tories and cafeterias, in grants for the pur-
pose of enabling schools and colleges to ac-
quire certain facilities for the teaching
of science, language and mathematics, and
in the distribution of federal surplus prop-
erty. That church colleges have benefited
from all these programs is indisputable.
But it is also indisputable that the assist-
ance furnished these institutions has ad-
vanced the general welfare of the nation.
Finally, I should mention that the sepa-
ration principle has not been construed in
practice to require denial of governmental
benefits to persons in situations where reli-
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gious bodies or institutions could be said
to receive indirect aid from these benefits.
I call your attention, for instance, to the
granting of G. I. benefits to students, loans
to college students and free lunches for
school children. The fact that some stu-
dents may attend church colleges and pa-
rochial schools does not disqualify them
for these benefits.
I have reviewed at some length the var-
ious types of situations in which govern-
ment has recognized the significance of re-
ligion in our national life, has accommo-
dated its tax policy in recognition of the
contribution made by religion to the com-
munity, and in the impartial distribution of
financial benefits designed to serve the gen-
eral welfare has made grants to all insti-
tutions serving the national purpose, in-
cluding institutions operated under church
auspices. Surely these practices make clear
that it has not been the general understand-
ing in the American interpretation of the
separation principle that government must
be indifferent to religion and its contribu-
tion to the national life, that it cannot in
various ways give limited assistance on a
nondiscriminatory basis to religious func-
tions and activities, or that in the disburse-
ment of public funds for social welfare
functions, it must discriminate against re-
ligious bodies rendering services that gov-
ernment may properly support or subsidize.
Certainly these practices do not point to a
"wall of separation" between Church and
State, to absolute and complete separation
or to the conclusion that government can
do nothing which in fact aids religion. In
none of these cases is the government fa-
voring one church over another, attempting
to prescribe by compulsion a national creed
forcing religion on unbelievers or attempt-
ing to operate or control a church or
churches.
Constitutional Interpretation
The American tradition of separation of
Church and State finds its legal expression
in the provisions of the federal and state
constitutions, and attention will now be
directed to the question of constitutional
interpretation. Both because of time limi-
tations and because the current questions
and controversies turn on the provisions
of the federal constitution which explicitly
limit Congress and which by judicial act
have been made applicable to the states, I
shall confine my discussion to the federal
provisions. But before doing so, I should
make clear that many state constitutions
contain explicit provisions which on their
face prescribe specific limitations on the ex-
penditure of public funds which are more
rigid than those stated in the federal consti-
tution. Often these provisions limit expen-
diture to institutions under public control,
and in many cases they prohibit the use
of public funds to assist sectarian education
or to assist schools which are controlled by
religious bodies. It is clear that under these
state constitutional provisions any aid to
parochial schools or to church colleges in
support of their educational programs
would be unconstitutional.
We turn then to the federal constitution.
The first amendment says that "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free ex-
ercise thereof. . . ." Here is the language
on which discussion and controversy are
centered. This is the language which in its
twin phrases is interpreted to incorporate
the principle of separation of Church and
State into the federal constitution. What
does it mean? I think we all have a good
idea of what is meant by the "free exer-
cise" of religion. This embraces freedom
of religion in its fullest dimensions-free-
dom of conscience, freedom of worship,
freedom to organize and operate churches,
to preach and teach, to evangelize and to
seek to win converts-in short, all that is
embraced within the concept of religious
activity. But what is meant by a law re-
specting "an establishment of religion."
Its meaning is not so clear and scholars
are not agreed on the original significance
of these words as used by the drafters. Did
it mean that Congress could not set up a
national church? Certainly this would be
its minimum content. Did it mean that
Congress could not favor one religion over
another and that as between religions it
must maintain neutrality? Certainly this is
an interpretation that well fits the Ameri-
can religious scene and the diversity of re-
ligions found here. Does it mean some-
thing more than this?
At this point we look to Supreme Court
decisions for illumination and to key state-
ments found in important cases. The first
occurred in the course of the majority
opinion in the well-known and now famous
case of Everson v. Board of Educ., where
the Court held constitutional a local school
board's action in providing bus transporta-
tion at the expense of public tax funds
for children attending parochial as well as
public schools. This was the specific prob-
lem before the Court, and the majority
found nothing unconstitutional about the
school board's action. It is evident, there-
fore, that anything the Court said in that
case about what either Congress or the
states may not do to aid religion was dic-
tum. The principal paragraph of Mr. Jus-
tice Black's much-quoted dictum in this
case reads as follows:
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The 'establishment of religion' clause of the
First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Govern-
ment can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all re-
ligions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force nor influence a person
to go to or to remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a
belief or disbelief in any religion. No per-
son can be punished for entertaining or
professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for
church attendance or non-attendance. No
tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called,
or whatever form they may adopt to teach
or practice religion. Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can, openly or se-
cretly, participate in the affairs of any re-
ligious organizations or groups and vice
versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause
against establishment of religion by law
was intended to erect 'a wall of separation
between church and state ... '
It will be noted that the Court in this
broad dictum, purporting to interpret the
nonestablishment clause, included some
ideas that clearly come under the free
exercise of religion concept. Any attempt
by government to force or influence a per-
son to remain away from church or to pro-
fess a disbelief in any religion or to pun-
ish him for entertaining or professing re-
ligious beliefs or for church attendance
would be a clear violation of religious free-
dom. What appears in this dictum as dis-
tinctively an interpretation of the non-es-
tablishment idea is that the government
cannot set up a church, pass laws which
aid one religion, aid all religions or prefer
one religion over another, force or influ-
ence a person to go to church, force him
to profess a belief in religion, punish him
for disbelief or nonattendance at church,
levy a tax to support any religious activities
or institutions that teach or practice relig-
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ion, or participate in the affairs of any re-
ligious organizations or groups. In short,
nonestablishment means that the govern-
ment can do nothing to sanction or aid re-
ligion. Translated in terms of the right of
the individual, this means that a person
enjoys a constitutional right to be free
from any governmentally-sanctioned relig-
ion. Finally, it should be noted that Mr.
Justice Black concludes this part of his
opinion by referring to Jefferson's famous
statement that the Constitution is intended
to erect "a wall of separation between
church and state."
That nonestablishment should mean
that the government may not sanction a
particular religion or establishment or force
religion on anyone is understandable. Such
a construction promotes both the freedom
of the believer and the freedom of the un-
believer, and both are entitled to constitu-
tional protection. On this basis the Court,
at its second last session, held invalid the
provision of the Maryland Constitution
requiring a declaration of belief in God as
a condition of holding public office. Like-
wise, on the same basis, the Court this past
term declared unconstitutional the nonsec-
tarian prayer sanctioned by New York law
and used in some of the public schools in
that state. I shall say more about this
decision later.
Returning to Mr. Justice Black's opinion
in the Everson case, it is his statement that
government cannot aid all religions that
presents the real difficulty. Did this mean
that government could, under no circum-
stances, do anything to recognize and en-
courage religious activities or that, in grant-
ing assistance for valid public purposes in
areas where both government and the
churches operate, it was required to dis-
criminate against religious organizations
which, along with others, help discharge
these functions? If this is what was meant,
then was this intended by the language
of the first amendment? As I have previ-
ously indicated, it is, indeed, highly doubt-
ful that this was intended. Moreover, the
various practices engaged in by govern-
ment that I detailed above cast serious
doubt on the authenticity of an interpreta-
tion of the first amendment which would
require invalidation of any governmental
practice that can be seen as an "aid to reli-
gion." Indeed, the Everson case itself re-
jects this notion since the actual holding
was that a school board could use public
funds to reimburse parents for the cost of
transporting children to parochial as well
as to public schools. In short, the Consti-
tution does not require a state to discrimi-
nate against children attending parochial
schools when disbursing funds for school
transportation.
I should like here to stress the point in
respect to discrimination. It seems quite
clear that to discriminate in the enjoyment
of legal privilege because of religion is in
itself a violation of religious freedom. To
permit parks to be used for all assemblies
except religious assemblies, to levy a special
tax on religious activities alone, to forbid
owning of property by religious societies,
to deny the benefit of police and fire pro-
tection to property solely because it is used
for religious purposes, would all be in-
stances of discrimination on the ground of
religion. The point I am making here in
regard to the "no aid" argument is that, if
pressed to the extreme of denying to reli-
gion and religious activities, rights and
privileges otherwise generally recognized
under law, it becomes a means of defeating
the free exercise of religion.
The decisions that immediately followed
Everson dealt with the released-time prob-
lem. In Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board
of Educ., the majority held invalid a re-
leased-time arrangement whereby public
school property was used for the teaching
of religion by teachers supplied by the pri-
mary religious groups, but at the expense
of one hour per week of school time. Par-
ticipation in the program was voluntary,
and children whose parents objected to
participation were assigned other school
activities during this period. The majority
of the Court considered the released-time
program to be an unlawful involvement by
the public school system in a program
of religious education. As the majority saw
it, the churches were using the schools as
a means of recruiting students for religious
education classes under circumstances that
resulted in coercion of students to attend.
But here again we have a dissenting view,
this time by Mr. Justice Reed, who felt that
the majority were running the separation
argument into the ground, and in support
of this, he pointed to many instances in
American history where the State had taken
a sympathetic view with respect to educa-
tion for religious purposes.
Broadly interpreted, McCollum could
have meant that the separation principle
derived from the non-establishment limita-
tion requires the State to be completely
indifferent to religion and to the interest of
parents in religious education. This is the
only actual decision by the Supreme Court
where the holding can be said to rest on
a broad theory of separation of Church
and State. Actually the case could easily
be interpreted more narrowly to mean that
the State may not make itself a party to
any scheme whereby religious education is
forced on children in the public schools. A
broad interpretation of the case was repu-
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diated by the later decision in Zorach v.
Clauson where the Court sharply limited
McCollum by its holding that a program
of released time for religious education
of children in the public schools was con-
stitutional, provided that the classes were
not conducted on the school premises. For
all practical purposes, a majority of the
Court had now swung around to the views
expressed by Mr. Justice Reed in dissent
in the McCollum case. This becomes evi-
dent when we look more closely at Mr.
Justice Douglas' majority opinion and
also at the opinions written for the four
dissenting Justices who argued strenuously
that the distinction between this case and
the McCollum case was insubstantial and
even trivial, and did not warrant a differ-
ence in result. The dissenters appear to be
right in saying that there was no sub-
stantial distinction between the two cases.
What is far more important was Mr. Justice
Douglas' opinion in Zorach. Speaking for
a majority of the Court, he sharply limited
the language previously used in the Everson
case. Indeed, in view of the fact that
Zorach is a later case, it is surprising that
in so much of the current discussion of
Church-State problems in their constitu-
tional aspects, the fashion is to quote the
Everson opinion even though it was sub-
stantially weakened by what Mr. Justice
Douglas said in Zorach. In the course of
his opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas said:
We are a religious people whose institutions
presuppose a Supreme Being. We guarantee
the freedom to worship as one chooses. We
make room for as wide a variety of beliefs
and creeds as the spiritual needs of man
deem necessary. We sponsor an attitude on
the part of government that shows no par-
tiality to any one group and that lets each
flourish according to the zeal of its adher-
ents and the appeal of its dogma. When the
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state encourages religious instruction or
cooperates with religious authorities by ad-
justing the schedule of public events to
sectarian needs, it follows the best of our
traditions. For it then respects the religious
nature of our people and accommodates
the public service to their spiritual needs.
To hold that it may not would be to find
in the Constitution a requirement that the
government show a callous indifference to
religious groups. That would be preferring
those who believe in no religion over those
who do believe. Government may not fi-
nance religious groups nor undertake re-
ligious instruction nor blend secular and
sectarian education nor use secular institu-
tions to force one or some religion on any
person. But we find no constitutional re-
quirement which makes it necessary for
government to be hostile to religion and to
throw its weight against efforts to widen
the effective scope of religious influence.
The government must be neutral when it
comes to competition between sects. It may
not thrust any sect on any person. It may
not make a religious observance compul-
sory. It may not coerce anyone to attend
church, to observe a religious holiday, or
to take religious instruction. But it can
close its doors or suspend its operations as
to those who want to repair to their reli-
gious sanctuary for worship or instruction.
No more than that is undertaken here.
Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion for the
majority in the Zorach case is quoted at
length since it reflects a basic difference
in approach. To be sure, it overlaps in
large part what was said in Everson. The
government may not finance religious
groups, must be neutral between sects, can-
not undertake religious instruction or force
religion, religious instruction or a religious
observance on anyone. There are notable
points of difference, however, and these
points of difference become crucial and
central in any discussion of the problem.
First of all, the Zorach opinion recognizes
that the first amendment itself says nothing
about the separation of Church and State.
Separation is not in itself a starting point
in constitutional thinking. It follows and
is required only to the extent that it flows
from the clauses relating to non-establish-
ment and the free exercise of religion.
The first amendment, then, according to
Zorach, does not ordain a complete and
absolute separation of Church and State
in every respect. Implicitly, the Court in
Zorach repudiates the notion that the first
amendment establishes a "wall of separa-
tion" between Church and State, for the
"wall" terminology and imagery is based
upon a notion of absolute and complete
separation. Moreover, in Zorach, the Court
emphasized the idea that the legislative
body of a state may take into account the
religious interests of its citizens and adapt
its legislative program to that end at least
so far as accommodation of public facilities
and services is concerned. Here, in other
words, is a disclaimer of the idea that the
state must be completely neutral as be-
tween religion and nonreligion. At least so
far as the first amendment is concerned,
the Court says that the legislature may take
account of the religious interests of its
people in its legislative programs so long
as it does not act with coercive effect upon
dissenters and nonbelievers, and no prefer-
ence is given to any one religious group.
In short, the government is not required
to act as thoughreligion and religious in-
stitutions did not exist. It may go further
and find that they perform a useful and
desirable function in the social commu-
nity, even a public purpose, and that with-
in the limits imposed by the Constitution,
their activities may be encouraged and
favored by the State. Finally, it is signifi-
cant that the Court said in the Zorach
case that the problem of separation of
Church and State, like many problems in
constitutional law, is one of degree. Indeed,
this may be the most significant statement
in the whole case. The problems in this
area cannot be solved by resort to doctri-
naire absolutes, verbal formulae or meta-
phors. As in the case of all constitutional
adjudications, the Court must look at these
problems in terms of the competing inter-
ests at stake and, therefore, take a critical
look both at what the State is trying to do
and what are the fundamental purposes
served by the constitutional restrictions.
Important Church-State problems came
before the Court again in the Sunday Clos-
ing Cases decided in 1960. The argument
was made that since the purpose of the
Sunday closing laws was to promote oberv-
ance of the Christian Sabbath, they were
invalid as an attempt to establish the Chris-
tian religion. The Court's answer was that
Sunday closing laws served a valid secular
purpose in setting aside a day of rest.
What is particularly important to observe
was the Court's observation that legisla-
tion aimed at valid secular purposes is
not rendered invalid because it may at the
same time have the secondary effect of aid-
ing religion. Noteworthy also was the point
of emphasis in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
concurring opinion that the purpose of
the first amendment was to keep the legis-
lature from dealing with religion as such.
The Prayer Case
I conclude this survey of the case ma-
terials by returning to the Court's latest de-
cision in the series, namely, the recent de-
cision holding invalid the New York non-
sectarian prayer as prescribed for use in
public schools. In comment, let me say
that, in my opinion, not much was lost by
requiring the elimination of this prayer
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situation. The mechanical and routine rep-
etition of a prayer with so little substantive
content as this nonsectarian prayer does
not in my opinion do much to advance the
cause of religion. Indeed, religion may suf-
fer from such practices. On the constitu-
tional question, I agree that it is not the
State's business to engage in or prescribe
religious practices in a situation like that
in the public schools, where such practices
are offensive to the conscience and beliefs
of some parents and children and the prac-
ticalities of the situation operate as a coer-
cive force to compel conformity. I sup-
pose that, consistent with this case, a
school may allow opportunity for silent
prayer or even for voluntary prayers by
children, since the Court's emphasis was
upon the fact that the prayer objected to
was an officially approved and sanctioned
prayer. Moreover, the Court indicated
that its decision did not affect patriotic
exercises that mention a Deity or the sing-
ing of patriotic songs which acknowledge
dependence upon God. My difficulties
with the case arise from the Court's reli-
ance upon the argument that such a prayer
exercise was an establishment of religion,
the failure to put the emphasis upon the
rights of nonconformists to be free from
religious practices prescribed by the State,
and the further failure to indicate what in-
terest must be shown to have been violated
in order to give standing to a person to
raise questions of this kind. It seems to
me that a person should be required to
show that the governmental practices of
which he complains impair either his free-
dom of conscience or his interest as a tax-
payer.
Mr. Justice Douglas' concurring opin-
ion deserves special attention. Finding that
the prayer was voluntary and did not result
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in coercion of nonconformists, and admit-
ting that this prayer exercise was not an es-
tablishment of religion in the historic sense
of the word, he based his concurrence on
the ground that the government was using
financial resources, namely, the public
school system, to promote religion and this
use of public property and the educational
system in specific support of a religious
practice is unconstitutional. Of special in-
terest was his intimation that the Everson
case was incorrectly decided-a conclusion
that may have substantial significance for
the future. Apparently Mr. Justice Doug-
las now feels that any governmental prac-
tice which results in aid to religion and re-
ligious instruction is unconstitutional.
Some Relevant Deductions
What conclusions, then, can be drawn
from the Supreme Court's decision on the
interpretation of the first amendment?
1) While the Court has construed this
amendment to state a principle of separa-
tion of Church and State, has acted rig-
orously under it to protect religious free-
dhm and has invalidated some state prac-
tices found to constitute an establishment of
religion, the Court as yet has failed to agree
on general principles of interpretation that
furnish some safe guide in determining the
application of the amendment to situations
we face today. In particular, the Court
needs to refine the interpretation of the
non-establishment language and what is
meant by "aid to religion." Any predic-
tion, for instance, that the Court will or
will not uphold the constitutionality of fed-
eral spending in support of parochial as
well as other schools is hazardous. At most,
one can suggest arguments and conclusions
based on prior decisions and opinions that
do not go directly to this question.
2) Although the Court has said that the
first amendment prohibits aid to religion,
it is evident from results reached that this
language cannot be literally construed. The
decisions in the bus transportation case
and the Sunday Closing Cases, both sus-
taining legislation directed to secular ends
but having the effect also of aiding religion,
make clear, it seems to me, that these ques-
tions cannot be resolved by the "aid" test.
Long sanctioned historical practices, such as
tax exemptions, support this conclusion as
well as the further conclusion that we add
nothing to the solution of these problems
by talking about a "wall of separation" be-
tween Church and State or about absolute
and complete separation. Absolute sepa-
ration or an absolute application of the
"no aid" principle is impossible when we
consider the inevitable and inherent inter-
relationship between the civil and religious
communities, the areas of overlapping and
concurrent functions, and the consideration
that a literal application of the "no aid"
idea, so as to discriminate in the enjoy-
ment of right and privilege solely on the
ground of religion, would itself raise the
serious question whether such discrimina-
tion was an unconstitutional restriction on
religious freedom.
3) Not only has the Supreme Court not
ruled that federal aid for parochial schools
would be unconstitutional, but, on the con-
trary, substantial arguments can be made
that such legislation would be constitutional
if part of a program for federal assistance
to schools generally. Since spending for
education is for the general welfare, since
parochial schools meet the educational
standards prescribed by state law, since
sending children to these schools dis-
charges the obligation of parents, imposed
by law, to send children to a school that
meets the state's standards, and since par-
ents in sending children to a parochial
school are exercising a constitutional free-
dom of choice, a case may be made out to
support the conclusion that federal aid to
these schools, as part of a general school
assistance program, would not be con-
demned as an establishment of religion, or
as forbidden aid to religion, but rather up-
held as legislation in support of the public
purposes served by these schools as part of
the total educational system, particularly if
the aid were limited to grants for the con-
struction of facilities and acquisition of
equipment and excluded any support such
as salaries paid to teachers.
Others would go further. Professor Kur-
land of Chicago has advanced the thesis
which finds some support in the opinions
that what the first amendment forbids is
legislation that uses religion as a basis for
classification so as to either burden or ben-
efit religious activities. In short, religion
as such cannot be the basis for imposing
burdens or conferring privileges. Quite
clearly, under this test, federal aid to pa-
rochial schools as part of a general pro-
gram of aid to schools would be constitu-
tional, since religion or religious teaching
is not the basis for determining eligibility.
Others, such as Professor Katz, have ad-
vanced the same principle. On the other
hand, it is equally clear to me that Con-
gress, if it chooses, may limit expenditure of
funds for educational purposes to institu-
tions under public control. I would not re-
gard this an unlawful discrimination, since
the distinction between institutions under
public control and those under private con-
trol is well supported in law as a basis for
classification. This would not be discrim-
ination on religious grounds. But if Con-
gress deliberately excluded only parochial
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schools from the benefits of federal aid leg-
islation, a question of religious discrimina-
tion would be raised.
Others may approach the problem in
different ways to achieve the same result.
One path of thinking draws a line between
direct and indirect benefits to religion and
to religious activity, and interprets the Su-
preme Court's decisions to permit expendi-
ture of federal funds in aid of valid public
objectives, including bus transportation to
parochial schools and distribution of free
secular textbooks to parochial school chil-
dren, on the theory that this is not direct
aid to religious education. The same might
be said for aid to assist in the construction
of school buildings. Somewhat related is
the "child benefit" theory, namely, that
public funds may appropriately be spent
in aid for purposes that contribute to the
welfare of students regardless of the
schools and colleges they attend, such as
bus transportation, free lunches, health
care and benefits, G. I. benefits, tuition and
scholarship grants, so long as there is no
direct subsidy of religious schools and reli-
gious education.
Conclusion
As a final word, I would say that what
the Supreme Court will do with this and
other problems, if ever they reach the
Court, is an open question. The difficulty
of prediction is compounded by the fact
that we now have two new Justices on the
bench and by Mr. Justice Douglas' recent
intimation that the Everson case was in-
correctly decided. If the Court adheres
to past decisions, the way continues open
for a construction of the first amendment,
along the lines of several different theories,
that would point to the validity of the use
(Continued on page 70)
